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Cbapter?
Tbe Significance oftbe Economic Summits
Joseph P. Daniels I
Marquette University and G8 Research Group, University of Toronto

1. Introduction
The protests that materialize at the economic summits and the expense of hosting a summit measured against actual policy outcomes call for a rethinking of
the significance of the high-profile international gatherings such as the annual
economic summits, and perhaps even the regular meetings of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMP) and the World Bank. 1
The tragic event') of September 11 and the Madrid bombings question the wisdom of hosting events that bring together the leaders of the wealthiest nations
in one location. The current global governance framework is, after all, crowded
with various summits. The principle consideration. therefore. is whether events
such as the annual economic summits contribute enough to global poJicymaking to warrant their continuation. 3
Because the economic summits are unique. in that they bring together the
leaders as opposed to ministers and bureaucrats, expectations for the meetings to deliver ambitious agreements certainly run high. But arc the summits
designed to deliver such agreements? Should the leaders attempt to deliver
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TIle summits are very expensive events. It is reported (Ibison 200 L) that the Okinawa summit
cost the Japanese government approximately V81 billion ($650 million). Furthermore, it
appears that some of these expenses were the results of misappropriation on the part of
Japanese bureal.lCrals.
At the time of the Genoa summit, editoriab offered by the leading media $howed opposing
opinions on the significance and contributions of the economic summits. One editorial, for
example, claimed (Nairn, 2001) that the summits are merely an "e~erdse in futility" that
generates too few decisions. Yet another (Helms, 2001) maintained tbat the record of the
summits is one of "sustained and substantial cooperation".
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ambitious and detailed agreements, even if they could? Are there specific issues that are more likely to be resolved in a summit fonnat as opposed to
clsewhere? This chapt~ considers what the aRnual xummits were originally

designed tu accomplish, economic policy cooperation. the rer..:ord of the summil accomplishmcnls. how the summits evolved, antIl.he role of the summits in
the conlext of the global economic governance architecture. lbis is done in the
(.'QDtexl of economic policymaking- Ihe summit's raison d 'bre-and, therefore.
looks past other important accompli shments and shortcomings of tile summits.
For example, this chapler does nO( consider the importance of the summits
in addressing issues of global terrorism, WMO!>, and collective responses to
North Korea and the Middle East (sa Kirton. 2003). Hence, rhe analysis here

is very focused and, arguably, conti ned.
The central thesis of this paper is thai the summits have contributed, though
in a limited way, to intemational economic policy cooperation and the summit
process is a significant organization in today's global governance architecture.
Nonetheless, it is argued ncre that globa1 economic siability depend'i, I1rst and
foremost, on good domestic economic policymaking. International policy cooper3lion. although ever more important in light of global economic integrntion, is of second order importance for global stability. Given this view. and the
record of what the summilS have and have nOI accomplished. the conclusion
reached here is that the leaders should avoid international policy coordinarion package,; and focus on sbaring information. This position is similar, bill
not as pessimistic as that of Rauen Sally (2001, p .S5) who slates that "most
arguments for globaJ governance are in fact bad economics and even worse
political economy", Hence. the media and other critical observers who look
for the summits to deliver concrete and detailed policy packages must realize
that less may be better when it comes to the economic summits.

2_ Tbe Genesis of the Economic Summits
The annual economic summils were bum out of the "Library Group", the informal meetings of the finance ministers (later the 05 meetings of the finance
ministers). TIte~ meetings began with an im-ilstion from George Shultz 10
the finunce ministers of Gennany, France. and the U.K. to meet in the White
House Library. At that time. President Valery Giscatd d'Eslaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt participated in these meetings as finance ministers and felt
these infonnal meeulI1!:s should continue with their remaining G.s counterpuM.s
(Annsl!ong, (988).
Three realities motivated the first summit, hosted and organized by President Giscard in 197:5. First there was the realization that some globaJ economic
event.'l, such as the 1973 - 1974 oil shocks. lie beyond the individual contml of
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policymakers in the major industrialized economies. Second, was the increasing integration of the advanced economies, and the number of common problems shared by policymakers. Third was the awareness that even in a flexible
ext:hange rate regime, nations cannol conduct e{;onomic polit:y independent of
one another.
2.1 Purpose
International economic policy cooperation was the formal purpose of the early
summits. Note that the summit declarations themselves often do not distinguish between international policy cooperation and international policy coordination. To many economists, however. economic policy cooperation is the exchange of infonnation designed to prevent or minimize the adverse spillovers
of economic policy actions thereby minimizing t:ommon harm. In t:ontrast,
economic policy coordination denotes the activities that bring about significant
changes in domestic policies in recognition of international interdependencies
so as to maximize the common good (von Furstenberg and Daniels, 1992). Policy coordination, therefore, is something much more concrete and ambitious
than policy cooperation.
In addition to international economic policy cooperation. the summits were
also intended to serve as a forum for the leaders to settle issues that their ministers were unable to resolve. In other words, the leaders would tackle the most
difficult issues of the day. The legitimization of floating exchange rates at the
first economic ~ummit is an example of an issue that had been eluding Ihe leaders and ministers for a number of years. (The agreement actually came about
on the eve of the summit as pressure mounted on U.S. and French deputies.)
The resolution and completion of thc Uruguay round of trade negotiation is another example of the summit participants taking on issues their ministers had
been unable to resolve.
2.2 Structure
President Giscard envisioned the first summit as a one-time meeting of the
leaders, although with hindsight it is clear that the Rambouillet summit would
spark a full cycle of summit meetings. The early summit meetings were designed to be exclusive and top down in structure. These two features remain to
day. In spite of the addition of Canada and Russia, and frequent invitations to
include the President of the European Union, the summit remains an exclusive,
private club whose members are in complete control of the club's membership. Keeping with the original top-down structure, the summits remain aloft
of other organizations and do not act laterally with any other international institution.
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It was also hoped that the summits would remain flexible and able to respond to shared crises of the day. Once the summits .seuled 00 an annual
timetable, some of this flexibility was lost The llbililY of the summitS to re-

act timely to pre~~ing problems soon ~came a point of debate. For example,
accordi ng to a souN ,herpa the Japanese delegation warned thei r counterpartS
of an impending crisis in Thailand during the 1997 Denve r surnrrul.· A preoccup!ltion w ith "the U.S. economic model", a failed E.U . summit that took place
immediately prior to the 07 summit, the obvious Jilek oCan agenda by the host
country. and the unwiUingness of the Japanese to press the is:;ue. hOWt\'Cl, left
the impending crisis otT the already crowded agenda.
The 1998 Birmingham summit was also conspicuously mute on the 1997
linancial crisis.. AI this s ummit. both !he mainstream media and the Summit
participants were focused on other current non-ecooomic iSSue5. The U.S. media were most interested in an unfolding domestic crisis for the U.S. Preside nl
as delails of a dalliance wilh an inlern were unfolding 81 home. Perhaps, this
was the rea.~ fOf" U.S. officials to hold press conferences at a hotel near the
airport a." opposed to the central-city media facility where all otner press confe rences were hekl. 1be olber issue of the day was the detonation of a nuclear
device by India. Though the U.S. pre.'I~ for a multilateral response to lnd ia '~
actions, a policy action consensus could not be reached (due mostl y to a yel
unused G le nn Amendment that automatically triggered U.S. unilateral sarn;.
lions). ~

In spite of the summits becoming sornedling of a pseudo-institution. they
still remai n Illort independent, eJevnted. and flexible 11mn other international
organizations. Because of these characteristics. the sum mit can be seen as n
policy conCf!rt: a non-institutiun thaI relies on a small number of ru ie.'I. A poli(.'Y
cuncen serves mainly to cooperate in policy formation rather than follow ruI~
established 10 manage international relations (Kirton, 1989 and Schwegmann.
2002). It is Ihi~ c hruucteristic that is lht: strong point and distinctiveoe!lS of the
annual summits.

A ~hcrpa is the pclVlMl ,~pce$mul!ive or !he leader and !he lem'1 COII'Iel fTom the native
rqwe.
senwiva of the finam:e and fom gn minlstCTS are ~ferred to as 1oO\Is-sherp:a5.
TItc:: Glenn amelldl1lenl requires automatic uno;tiun~ again~l l nation detonatinJ "nuclear
device. a11owiro, lite PresJdent but • few dftys \(l iIMJke the u !lCtlons unibtternl1y or pre·
&endng n ea.e against said 5anctl ont; to Con~~~. With his hand , lied by the ame~nc ,
Pre.5ident Clinton hd linle room 10 ~ his eounterparu 10 ;nin in a ooattinatt'd piItl..
age of EaIX:lion~.

bearn$ ....110 as5ist mt.IIIOtairo climbers in die Himalayas Uujltill. 1989). The penonaJ
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In ~pite of the fact thlilihe origim summit was envisioned as a " fire-side chat".
the globul media and other interested summit watchers cominue 10 e.x.pe<:1 the
]cflders to do much more thanjust exchange views. The t:ommunique. the publit: document generated by the swnmit process, is continuously scrutinized for
signs of quantitative policy commitmenll>. Summit watchers e~1 the sumrruls to delh'er inlernational policy coordination packages as opposed to merely
facilitating pulil")' l,,'OOpCration. In spite of this pressure. acrual examples of international policy coordination are not so easy to find.

3. I Exampks of Policy CuuntinatiOIl During the 19705 and 19805
Many C(.'tmomists regard the 1978 Bonn Summit as the hallm.'U"k of policy
coordinatioo. At this summit, the leaders committed to a policy package where
(he economies of Gennany and Japan were to be stimulated through 6scal
measures, thereby spurring economic growth lhroughout the G7 economies a locomotive effect. The other G7 nations, the United Slates in particular, were
to contain infllltionary pressures. A tripling of crude oil prices by OPEC the
following June halted efforts to complete the package of policy measures. This
pol;cy package was later criticized.. especially in Gennany, for mt:rely adding
to inflationary pressu!ts.
Some economists. in contrast. argue that the Ims summit is not a true e.xample of international policy coordination. Their claim is that the 1978 agreemem docs not represent an adjusunent of poli~ies that would not hove otherwise been undertaken without any such agreement to coordinale (Theuringer,
2001). Because the policy measures were likely 10 be undenaken unilaterally.
it is nOi. an effort to bring about signifi cant change... in domestic policies due to
international linkages and the promotion of imemational common good.
The Plaza-Louvre period of the last half of the 1980s is sometimes offered
as another example of international policy coordination. During this period.
tile advanced economy nations engaged in s ubstantial and cOOf"djnat.ed foreign
exchange iolerventions desigJIed 10 bring down the value of the doUar. The-5e
inlerventions. however, were Slerili"l.ed.· Hence. there was an unwillingness
to allow these coonlimll.ed foreign exchange interventions to affect domestic
ecooom.ies. In addition. the view among academic economists is that sterilized foreign exchange intervention was effective in the short run only. or at
best. Indeed this view found its way into the Jurgenson Repon of 1993. which
was commissioned by the leaders at the Versailles Summit in 1982 (Sarno

is the proce~ of ulKlerta.lcing IUl lIddit;onal portfolio opetatioo. r;ud! lIS wyin&
or sellin& &oYerrunent irl$tJ\tJnrol5 OJ" third curn:ncies. w lh:n the domestic IUOOCIlII'Y base i5

Sleriliutioo

unaffec1ed by the forcign exchange lfIIQStIdloD.

88

JOSEP H P. DANIELS

and Taylor. 200 1). Being unwilling to subordinate domestic economic (Xllicy
to achieve an international and shared ohjective, this era, therefore, does not
represent policy coonlinatioo either.
3.2 The Empirical Evidence
Empirical examinations of thelirst two rounds of the annual summits fwther

show that pol6cymakers were either unwilling or unabk to Mfill coooomtc: policy commitments agreed upon and put forward in the summit communiques.
Von Furstenberg and Daniels (1992) develop n mcu-ic for gauging the degree
of compliance on JXllicy commitments fonned al the summits. Using empirical evidence on outcomes, their resenrch indicates that policymakers delivered
on ahoul one-third of thei.r economic policy commitments. The summ.il", for
example, receiv~ relatively poor scores on commitments to stabilize exchange
rates and relatively higher scores on trade and energy corwnitmeots. The conclusion they reac h is that policymakm;; are bette r at delivering on miCroo..'tlnomic commitmenls mther than mac roeconomic ones.

The summit communiques not only reveal !he policy undenakings themselves, they also provide glimpses of what the undenakings promise to achieve.
In this way. some of the general economic relationships and means-ends link·
ager. that policyrnakcrs subscribe 10 also f,:nrne (0 light. As RIchard Cooper
(1985) points out, even ifpolicymakers have compatible objectives and simi·
lar economic coooitions. they may disagree on lbcir forecasts of fUUlre eve nts
and the structure of economies and therefore 00 the relationship of means to
ends.
There are very few empirical studies of the means-ends relationship advanced in the economic declarations. Daniels (1993) inventories the relatiooforupS found in the fi rst fifteen summit dedarntions. This s rudy finds thal most
of the ec<lnomic relationships, or understandings, can be characterized as arguable. That is, the mellils·ends relatiooship found in the commu nique can neither be rejected by the empirical evidence nor supp:med in a slltlistica1 sense.
On the one hand, the conclusion that policymakers generally do not conunit
themselves to undertaking... based on economic assumptions that nre vCJy risky
or run the c hance that they mlly he rejected outright by future empirical study
is not too remarkahle. On the other hand, it is a bit surprising that policyrnakers
do not completely "play it safe" and rely oruy on economic relationships that
are beyond dispute.
Of course the first of these s tudies focuses on quantitati"e commitme nts
to achieve some economic outcome and, therefore. are primarily examples of
policy coordination. The second, however, examines the framework in which
these commitments "''eI'e made and can be ~c n m~ so as a measure of ceo-

1,
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nomic policy cooperation. Because of the low score on policy undertakings
and the relatively neutral grade on means-ends relationships, one must conclude that the summits should primarily serve to cooperate rather than coordinate. Furthennore, policy cooperation must take precedence over policy coordination. After all, the leaders must first come to agreement on their economic
assessments, forecasl~, and economic ideology before subscribing to poli<:y
undertakings intended to achieve some specific objective.
The evidence cited above shows why there is considerable opposition to international economic policy coordination, especially among Gennan and U.S.
economists, but support for grealcr policy cooperation. Clearly another reason
for this resistance is the recognition that poJicymakers face a "technological
constraint" (Blackburn and Christenson 1989), that is, there is a limit to what
economists know and on the quaJity of their advice and forecasts. Another reason is that it has been shown (for example, Frankel and Rockett 1988) that
coordination based on incorrect infonnation or models can actually be counterproductive. Finally, if Gennan and U.S. finance ministers were to coordinate
on foreign exchange rates, thereby committing Iheir central banks to monetary
policy actions, this could compromise the autonomy of their central banks and
jeopardize their hard fought stocks of central bank credibility.
More recently there have been some examples of policy coordination
(though these policy packages have yet to be fully recognized.) The firsl example is the refonn of the international financial urchitecture and the second
is multilateral initiative on debt relief for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) a.~ reinforced by the Cologne initiative of 1999. It is quite possible,
in the very near future, that we will count the financial fight against terrorism
as the fruit of improvements in internationally coordinated efforts to combat
transnational crime.
3.3 Uneven Success
Whether or not the above examples are "true" examples of international policy
coordination, there is little doubt that the perfonnancc of the economic summits as a global governance body is uneven. Even though the summiteers may
have a view from the highest perspective possible, they are certainly no better
at predicting crises than lower-level participants.
Two recent examples of economic poliey cooperation failures are the inability to collectively recognize an impending collapse of an inflated Japanese
economy and, as mentioned earlier, the sununit participants refusal to hecd
Japan's warning of a possible crisis in Thailand in the spring of 1997. An
example of policy coordination failures is that incapacity to pass a multilateral agreement on investment (in spite of the fact that investment flows con-
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tinue to i~ at rates much greater than those seen in gtobal trade.) 10 regard to trade. the summits have demonstrdted the ability to gencr:ue critical

multilateral decision-making. m a ''RambouiUet effect",

~sulUng

in marginal

progress during periods of mu1ti'al~ml negotiations (Ullrich. 2(04), Nonetheless, the summits failed to dampen rising regionalis.m. aoo., particularly during
the ClintOf] administration. made little or 00 progress in expanding tra.d~ on a
multilateral basis need to provide better lendership, especially when mullilll!era! negotiarions stal l.
Why. then, are the summits 5uooe!>Sful in some areas, hut nol others' Some
policymakers and xadcmks agree mat perhaps the best single explanation
of the uneven success of the summits ties in the CODlpete:nce of the ministty
responsible for implementing the specific undertaking agreed to by the leaders
(Kokotsis. 1999). lbose intimately involved see the finance ministers' policy
process as the most developed and displaying the most coordination and follow
through. with the foreign ministers being second in this regard. In addition, lbe
fordgn flrinister.> have Well-elil3blisOOd links to institutions such as !he Paris
Club, the L\{f', and the World Batik.

4. The MarginaJizing of Economics
re~sents a turning point for the ecooornic summits.
At the end of this surrunit, the leaden issued a joint statement on hijacking.
This statement shows thot the summit agenda, for the fiTSt time, included issues other than global economics and marks the gradual margirutJizing of «:0nomics. as economic iJO.~ ues receive less and less attention with each round of

The 1978 Bonn Sumflril

sumntiu.
By the early 1990s. CCOfl()mic issues received limited space on the sununit
Excepl. f(K the Cologne sununit, global ecOflomic policy continues to
receive less attention III the summits despite calls by policymakers such as Gordon Brown, U.K.. finance minister, to "put economics back into the summit".
This murginal..iz.ing of economics is al!iO due in pan to tile inclusion of Russia ~ a near-full participant in 1997 and member in 1998. Russia was, and still
is economically asymmetric to the other 07 members. Its inclusion. therefore,
reflects the ai m to use the economic swnm its to achieve political objectives,
as opposed 10 economic ones. Th~ inclusion of Russia may also signal another
imponant change in the summits for the near future: the inclusion of China
as a member and the move to a 09. If China continues to move forward with
refonns and panicipatcs in a greater number of imponam institutions (e.g., permanent member of lhe United Nations Security Council, member of the G20.
and member of the World Trade Organization), it increases this possibility.
a~nda.
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Some observe rs c laim tlwl the conversion 10 lhe Eum may spark a change
in the G& process as well. 1be urgumt:lll is that lhere will be a fewer number uf
G8 nations with independerll mone truy policy. Hence. the s ummi t may evolve
to a triad-plus-Russia organization, thm is North Ame rica. E urope and Japan
plus Russia. This is un likely, however, a... mum::UU)' policy has never been pan.
of the economic summits in the firM plllcc.

5. The Significance or the Economic Summits in Today's Global
Governance Architecture
paper stressed Ibal. it is good domestic economic policymaking thaI is critical '0 glo bal economic stability. Cood domestic economic policymaldng spurs economic growth. creates an e nvirorunc l\I to promote financial stability. and reduces thc gap between those who have and those
who have not. 'The annual economic summits, therefore, can only promote
global economic stability by improving upon domestic economic policy making through inteTrultional economic policy cooperation.

The introduction 10 this

5. 1 Cooperate, not Coordiuate
If global econo mic stability is improved, first and foremost. throug b good domestic poticymaking. then Iberc is no instilution. even the summil... thai serves
as the ultimate centre for gloOOl economic governance. This is a vcry specific
claim. howe ver. as it fcx:uses on ecooomic issues o nly. It nl3y well be thai
the swnmiu an: at the cenlte or global go vernance, which e ncompa.~ much
more than economic issues. N~less. the summits should be ~n first and
foremost as a means for improving and generlltiIlg better domestic policies as
opposed to delivering pat:kages of coordinated policies designed to enhance
colk:ctive or joint welfare.
{)(her than testing meao!>-c:mJs relationships thai might he found in the declamlions. the effects of inlmllllKJnal policy cooperalion - !>haring information
and ideas - cannoc be measured . Whal is unp3.1o.table a bout this po."ilioo 10 Ihe
media and acade mic observers of the summit process (this author included)
is thai it means that we cannol quantitati vely e valua te lhe Significance of the
s ummit process. Hence. we cannot argue with any rigor, that the swnmits ac·
complished anything o r not. We can evaluate qualitatively the achievements of
the summit~, asse~8ing the appro priateness of W3 S discussed (Which is done
wmually by the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronlo and posted on
Ibe G8 Website at www.g7.utoronto.ca.)
S haring of infonnatioo intemationaUy, however. can do muc h to improve
domestic econo mic policym!lk..ing. Ce rtainl y Ihe s ummits are uniquely s uited
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to international policy cooperation. Having the highest view, the leaden must
surely ~ f3rthe:r than miniSters and bureaucrats. Hence, when the leaders of
the G8 C~ together and discuss economics conditions it must be wonh more
than just idle talk. By reaching understandings, as opposed 10 agreements or
undertakings. the summits are well prepared to set broad visions and aid in
domestic economic policymaking.
5.2 Improving the Process
Now that some limits have ~n imposed on what the summits can reasonably
deliver in tenns of economic policymaking, what do !his mean for the summit
process itseln In order to build and maintain the credibility of the process,
the G8 should not set themselves up as a "Super Cabinet" or direcmire for
global go\'emance ( Hodges, 1994), and in spite of pressure by the media for the
summits to produce bard agreements and detailed solutions to world problems.
the leaders must avoid giving the impression that they are capable of dealing
with all issue·s and solving all crises.
In spite of this limitation, the summits provide the best "bully pulpit" to
advance perspectives on globalization. This is, arguably, their most important
responsibility, because international trade and engagemem in the global marketplace is still seen by a majority of people in the advanced nations as a zerosum game. There is no better forum that couJd be used to articulaJe the: benefits
to a nation's res idents from participating in the global marketplace. And yet,
this opportunity remains to be fully utilized.
Of course the summil process can be improved upon and there are a number of ~I s o n how to do so (~ Hodges. Kinon, and Daniels, 1999). In
le mlS of globaJ e(XJllOrWC policy, and in light of we evidence and views given
hereio, the summit prooess could be improved by:
I. Streamlining the procc:Sli along the lines recommemkd by John Major in

1992.
2. Removing from the agenda any domestic economic issues 00{ fully internationalized. Or, in other words, remove those issues that do not h.old the
possibility of assembling international synergies.
3. Focu!ling on i!>!>ues whose means-ends relationships are well understood so
that ministers can see th~ to fruitiOll.
4. Worlting for agreements in areas where leaders have real authority, For example, monetary policy should continue to be off the table since the leaders
do n01 hold any authority in this area.
5. Working for agreements in areas where credible and effective dome~lic in·
stitutions exist
6. Continuing 10 communicllte well with ministers.
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7. Avoid givinS the imprcssjon thai the summits ClUJ solve every problem, or
"lower expectations, L"OOllht lernpe:r.nure and even try to ignore the head~
of stille" (Hodges. 1999. p. 72).

Given tbis menu for improvemem. what are !he issues that should be addressed at the summits? The moSt obvious would be 10 revive the Irtalled Doha
Trade Round Another issue that also has impertalll humanitarian implications
fOf developing nations is to continue multilateral debt relief without substituting it for eominued development a.o;.sistaDCe.

6. Conclusion
II is argued bere tM! the summits should not be trnn~fonned or elevated to
SOlne system of global ceO/lomie governance. Rather. global economic ~
bitity dcpends on good domestic economic policymaking and, lbcrefo~. the
I:conomic sununit~ canOOI substitute for effective and effi cient policy making
within sovereign nations. The swwnits. therefore. ~hould be seen first and
foremost as a means for impro.... ing and generating better domestic poti£ie.r
via cooperation as opposed to delivering packuge~ of c:oordin:tled policies. By
focusing on international economic policy cooperation. the summits can conlribute much to improvi ng domestic ~'O nomic policy making.
The prote:>! 3t the Geooll summit and the even[S of September 11 provide a
well-timed opportu nity 10 re thinltthe formal of the li'ummi[S.lo stream1ine t~
process. and 10 return 10 the European or RambouiUet model of summitry. Perh:i.ps this is the path the summits are on fo llowing the "secluded and intimate"
2002 summit in Kananaskis (Bayne. 20(2).
The world was I very uncertain place in 1975. There wen: oil shocks, an
unsenlcd fureign-cxchange system. and 11 global recession. TIle original summit was formed to deal with these unc:el1ainties. lbe world is again an uncertain place. with financial crises. me emergence of Russia and China as political and economic fun:es, terrorist auacks on the UnilOO States. an economic
downturn among the advanced economies, and turbulence in the world's equit)' markets. The annual summits remain ltS 3 significant forum for sharing
information and reducing this uncertainty.
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